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Most Favoured Nation Clauses:

Towards an Assessment Framework under EU Competition Law

open-access


Friso Bostoen

DOI https://doi.org/10.21552/core/2017/3/9

This work is distributed under the Creative Commons Licence Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).



It is often argued that most favoured nation clauses (MFNs) should be assessed on a case-by-case basis given the perceived lack of a coherent theory guiding their assessment. This article asks whether this is the case: do we lack an assessment framework of MFNs under EU competition law? In answering this question, regard is had to both older case law and the most recent developments. Taken together, most of the issues in assessing MFNs do appear to be generally agreed upon. Moreover, legal scholarship complements the theory where the courts and authorities did leave a question open. Thus, it is offered that we are indeed well on our way to a clear assessment framework of MFNs under EU competition law.

Friso Bostoen, PhD researcher at the Institute for Consumer, Competition & Market, Faculty of Law, KU Leuven (University of Leuven). For correspondence: <friso.bostoen@kuleuven.be>. Please note that all links were last accessed on 9 June 2017.

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