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Tacit Collusion and the Boundaries of Competition Law:

The Parallel Case of Common Ownership and Algorithmic Pricing

John Weche, Thomas Weck

DOI https://doi.org/10.21552/core/2021/1/4

Keywords: tacit collusion, algorithms, common ownership, Digital Markets Act, DMA, New Competition Tool, NCT

Tacit collusion gives rise to major practical challenges for the enforcement of competition law. A problem which is well known from the gas station markets, now acquires new topicality with the intervention of institutional investors (‘common ownership’) and the use of online pricing algorithms. This article connects the previous strands of discussion and establishes a link to the discussion regarding a New Competition Tool.
Keywords: tacit collusion; algorithms; common ownership; Digital Markets Act; DMA; New Competition Tool; NCT

Prof Dr John Weche and PD Dr Thomas Weck, LLM, are employees at the Monopolies Commission in Bonn, Germany. John Weche is also Professor of Economics and Location Policy at the University of Applied Sciences Hamburg. The article reflects exclusively the personal views of the authors. The authors published an earlier version of this article in Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (issue 22/2020) in German. For correspondence: <mailto:john.weche@haw-hamburg.de> and <mailto:thomas.weck@monopolkommission.bund.de>.


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