%A Lundqvist, Björn %D 2021 %T Killer Acquisitions and Other Forms of Anticompetitive Collaborations (Part II): %! Killer Acquisitions and Other Forms of Anticompetitive Collaborations (Part II): %X <p>In two consecutive articles, of which this is the second one, I analyse so-called ‘killer acquisitions’ and other collaborations detrimental to competition. In this article, I have analysed the merger rules and whether they can identify and capture the problematic cases identified in Part I. After concluding that this is not the case, I present a proposal that I believe would benefit competition and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. I suggest that certain firms in the pharmaceutical sector should be obliged to notify collaborations that imply change of control over research, research assets or research results, and that the focus under the merger rules should be on innovation and innovation results. A notification system should thus be put into place also for strategic alliances including license agreements and R&amp;D collaborations in which the control over promising research or research capabilities is transferred to a large pharmaceutical firm. Such transfer is conducted through the covenants and restrictions of an R&amp;D start-up and its key employees, even though there are no formal change of control of the start-up as such. I furthermore suggest that that ancillary agreements to such collaborations including shareholding agreements and option programmes that imply that leading researchers are locked-in by explicit or implicit non-compete and other forms of covenants should be scrutinised in the merger review. Keywords: mergers, antitrust, killer acquisitions</p> %U https://doi.org/10.21552/core/2021/4/4 %0 Journal Article %R 10.21552/core/2021/4/4 %J European Competition and Regulatory Law Review %V 5 %N 4