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Effect on Trade Between Member States: Journal Artikel

What Is the Standard of Proof to Establish Grounds for Applying EU Law?

Martin Milán Csirszki, András Tóth

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Jahrgang 7 (2023), Ausgabe 1, Seite 4 - 14

This article examines a judgment of the Supreme Court of Hungary (the Curia), in which the Curia called upon in connection with the effect on trade between Member States its holding that competition authorities – compared to other administrative authorities – are required to establish a higher standard of proof in order to draw a reasonable conclusion as to the existence of an infringement. It ruled that this would be in order to draw a reasonable conclusion as to the existence of an infringement. This requirement comes from the quasi-criminal nature of competition proceedings. In this declaration, from the context of the effect on trade between Member States, the Curia equated the applicable standard of proof to substantial competition law infringements with the criterion of applicable law, which only determines appropriate applications of EU competition law. In this article, we present the relevant parts of this case before scrutinising the related literature, legislation and case law. After presenting the case, we analyse the effects on trade between Member States, as well as the role of the market definition in establishing inter-state trade. Then, we turn our attention to questions related to proof and evidence in competition law, both in the context of substantial infringements of law and of the effects on trade between Member States. The Ziegler case points to the direction that these two cannot be equated. In the end, we sketch out the consequences arising from the Curia’s judgment. Keywords: effect on trade between Member States; NAAT-rule; market definition; applicable law; standard of proof; case law


Overview of the National Enforcement of EU Competition Law Journal Artikel

András Tóth

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Jahrgang 2 (2018), Ausgabe 4, Seite 258 - 270

This article provides a practical overview of the most recent and interesting developments arising from the national enforcement of EU competition law. It is not only the preliminary rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union that highlight interesting competition cases taking place at national level. For example, as will be discussed in this article, other important developments such as the recognition of compliance programmes and the first pricing algorithm case also occurred at national level. It appears that national competition authorities (NCAs) are more opened to ensure consistency between competition and other policies, such as the protection of personal data (eg the Facebook case in Germany) and the promotion of small and medium sized enterprises. NCAs can more rapidly adapt to the changing competition policy context, as can be seen, for example, in their treatment of mergers involving targets not possessing high enough turnover but having significant market potential. The ECN+ Directive provides NCAs with a minimum common tool-kit and effective enforcement powers for the implementation of EU antitrust rules in many important areas. However, there are still significant areas (eg regarding the admissibility of criminal evidence and multiple filings) where further improvements would be desirable in the future. Keywords: Data Driven Economy, Multiple Merger Filing, Admissability of Criminal Evidences, European Competition Network (ECN), Cross-Border Enforcement of Competition Fines


How Could Competition Authorities Reward Competition Compliance Programmes? Journal Artikel

András Tóth

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Jahrgang 1 (2017), Ausgabe 1, Seite 4 - 10

Should competition authorities reward compliance? How could competition authorities reward compliance? This article aims to examine these questions by analysing the approaches taken by the European Union and national competition authorities, and the positive and negative effects that may result if competition authorities reward competition compliance programmes. Finally, the paper argues that the current neutral position taken by the national competition authorities in relation to compliance programmes should no longer be maintained, and proposes a number of methods that the competition authorities could employ to reward competition compliance programmes.

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