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The search returned 5 results.

Effect on Trade Between Member States: journal article

What Is the Standard of Proof to Establish Grounds for Applying EU Law?

Martin Milán Csirszki, András Tóth

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 7 (2023), Issue 1, Page 4 - 14

This article examines a judgment of the Supreme Court of Hungary (the Curia), in which the Curia called upon in connection with the effect on trade between Member States its holding that competition authorities – compared to other administrative authorities – are required to establish a higher standard of proof in order to draw a reasonable conclusion as to the existence of an infringement. It ruled that this would be in order to draw a reasonable conclusion as to the existence of an infringement. This requirement comes from the quasi-criminal nature of competition proceedings. In this declaration, from the context of the effect on trade between Member States, the Curia equated the applicable standard of proof to substantial competition law infringements with the criterion of applicable law, which only determines appropriate applications of EU competition law. In this article, we present the relevant parts of this case before scrutinising the related literature, legislation and case law. After presenting the case, we analyse the effects on trade between Member States, as well as the role of the market definition in establishing inter-state trade. Then, we turn our attention to questions related to proof and evidence in competition law, both in the context of substantial infringements of law and of the effects on trade between Member States. The Ziegler case points to the direction that these two cannot be equated. In the end, we sketch out the consequences arising from the Curia’s judgment. Keywords: effect on trade between Member States; NAAT-rule; market definition; applicable law; standard of proof; case law





The SSNIP Test and Zero-Pricing Strategies: journal article

Considerations for Online Platforms

Daniel Mandrescu

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 4, Page 244 - 257

The increasing critique on the business practices of the major online platforms in Europe is gradually leading to a rising in the number of abuse of dominance investigations and prohibition decisions. Such present and future cases revolving around the dominant position of various online platforms depend greatly on the correct definition of the relevant market. The process of the market definition with regard to online platforms requires, however, revisiting the compatibility of the current competition law tool kit, particularly in the case of the hypothetical monopolist test (HMT). Accordingly, the application of the HMT based on a small but significant non transitory increase in price (SSNIP) test of demand elasticity, will require an overhaul in order to maintain its relevance in the case of zero-pricing strategies commonly used by online platforms. In such cases the only feasible option for assessing demand elasticity for the purpose of performing the HMT entails converting the price centred analysis into a quality oriented one, namely based on a small but significant non transitory decrease in quality (SSNDQ). In the absence of such a conversion the market definition in the case of online platforms relying on zero-pricing will be performed solely based on a qualitative evaluation of the functionalities facilitated by such platforms as seen in the Google Shopping case. Although such outcome is not inherently problematic it does imply backtracking to older practices rather than advancing the development of a more future resilient legal framework and tool kit which should always be pursued. Keywords: Online Platforms, Market Definition, Digital Economy, Market Power, Data Costs, Quality Considerations, Demand Elasticity

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