CoRe - European Competition and Regulatory Law Review

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The search returned 2 results.

Daniel Mandrescu

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 4, Page 244 - 257

The increasing critique on the business practices of the major online platforms in Europe is gradually leading to a rising in the number of abuse of dominance investigations and prohibition decisions. Such present and future cases revolving around the dominant position of various online platforms depend greatly on the correct definition of the relevant market. The process of the market definition with regard to online platforms requires, however, revisiting the compatibility of the current competition law tool kit, particularly in the case of the hypothetical monopolist test (HMT). Accordingly, the application of the HMT based on a small but significant non transitory increase in price (SSNIP) test of demand elasticity, will require an overhaul in order to maintain its relevance in the case of zero-pricing strategies commonly used by online platforms. In such cases the only feasible option for assessing demand elasticity for the purpose of performing the HMT entails converting the price centred analysis into a quality oriented one, namely based on a small but significant non transitory decrease in quality (SSNDQ). In the absence of such a conversion the market definition in the case of online platforms relying on zero-pricing will be performed solely based on a qualitative evaluation of the functionalities facilitated by such platforms as seen in the Google Shopping case. Although such outcome is not inherently problematic it does imply backtracking to older practices rather than advancing the development of a more future resilient legal framework and tool kit which should always be pursued. Keywords: Online Platforms, Market Definition, Digital Economy, Market Power, Data Costs, Quality Considerations, Demand Elasticity

Nicole Rosenboom

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 4, Page 271 - 279

National competition authorities have assessed many hospital mergers over the years. During merger control proceedings, the authority determines the negative effects of the merger in the form of a potential price increase and decrease in the quality of care provided by the hospital. These assessments are difficult. Merger control can lead to heated debates and questions over whether the analysis is correct and considers all possible outcomes. To provide a full analysis of the effects of a hospital merger for all relevant actors (patients, the hospital itself, health insurers, the government, and hospital staff) the Social Cost and Benefit tool can be used. This framework is applied in other fields of economics, but it can be useful in cases that involve public interest and non-competition concerns. One could call the tool the Competition Cost and Benefit Analyses (CCBA) tool when it is adjusted for use in a merger case. This article demonstrates how the CCBA can be used and how the unique features of a national healthcare and health insurance system can be taken into account during its use. This article applies the framework to the Netherlands due to recent developments in that country and the call for more focus on public interests in merger control of Dutch hospitals. Keywords: Merger Control, Hospitals, Price, Quality

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