Mateusz Musielak, Tomasz Feliszewski

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 6 (2022), Issue 4, Page 330 - 333

Ana Mihaljević

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 6 (2022), Issue 4, Page 322 - 324

Sara Gobbato

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 4, Page 407 - 410

Claire Turgot

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 2, Page 112 - 121

Large digital technology companies are suspected of engaging in a ‘killer acquisitions’ strategy whereby they acquire promising start-ups to eliminate potential future rivals or to integrate them into their own offerings, thereby cementing their dominance. Many of these transactions escape the scrutiny of competition authorities as they do not meet the notification thresholds. This has generated a growing sense of urgency about the need to amend the European Commission’s merger ‘toolbox’. However, an increasing reliance on non-traditional theories of harm may prevent consideration of the transaction’s substantial benefits for innovation and competition. This short contribution takes a critical look at current merger control and discusses the possibility of a more open approach to reviewing acquisitions in the digital space. Keywords: mergers, European Union, reform, online platforms, competition policy

Mariya Papazova

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 2, Page 132 - 137

Kiran Desai

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 1, Page 11 - 23

Policy debate in the EU and international fora and institutions are leading to proposed changes to competition law as applied to the technology and in particular digital sectors. A review of the proposals identifies two groups, first, those that are a more aggressive application of competition law and second, those addressing non-traditional goals, such as data privacy. The EU’s Digital Markets Act is an example of the latter, while a change to the EU Merger Regulation is an example of the former. The proposed changes are open to criticism, for example because they create a differential application of competition law to one sector compared to others and there are definitional challenges. Furthermore, competition economic analysis, with its emphasis on consumer welfare,may need to be broadened to enable a normative and theoretical consistency between the current laws and the proposed changes. In addition, where the changes are to address goals not susceptible to such analysis, such as human rights, lawyers will need to be open to adding arguments based on other jurisprudential theories to support their cases. Keywords: competition; digital; proposals; objective; economics

John Weche, Thomas Weck

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 1, Page 4 - 10

Tacit collusion gives rise to major practical challenges for the enforcement of competition law. A problem which is well known from the gas station markets, now acquires new topicality with the intervention of institutional investors (‘common ownership’) and the use of online pricing algorithms. This article connects the previous strands of discussion and establishes a link to the discussion regarding a New Competition Tool. Keywords: tacit collusion; algorithms; common ownership; Digital Markets Act; DMA; New Competition Tool; NCT

Eleana Poulladou

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 230 - 233

Erik Kjær-Hansen

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 239 - 242

Ana Marjančić

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 226 - 229