Jeroen Dewispelaere, Rasmus Van Heddeghem

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 7 (2023), Issue 4, Page 232 - 235

Egzone Osmanaj, Adnan Jashari

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 6 (2022), Issue 3, Page 222 - 236

The purpose of this article is to do a comparative analysis of the competition law in the EU, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Albania, regarding the regulation of anti-competitive agreements. The article focuses on the treatment and analysis of three basic notions: agreement, concerted practice, and decisions by associations of undertakings. The methodology is mainly based on analysis of the relevant legal framework of the countries included in this study, ie the article uses the method of analysis of legislation and the comparative method. The article also uses the method of case law analysis, which makes it possible to analyse the EU case law approach in relation to the concept of prohibited agreements. Specifically, we assess the approach of the European Commission and the EU Courts, from which the main criteria that must be taken into consideration when defining the notion of prohibited agreements result. The findings of the legislative and comparative analysis show that there is a high approximation between the legal framework of Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Albania, with that of the EU, in the field of prohibited agreements. Keywords: agreements between undertakings; concerted practices; decisions by associations of undertakings; Kosovo; North Macedonia; Albania

Paul K Gorecki

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 6 (2022), Issue 4, Page 294 - 305

In 2022 Ireland made two important contributions to the debate over price signalling: (i) the publication of the National Competition Agency’s (NCAs) extensive investigation into alleged anticompetitive price signalling in private motor insurance (PMI); and (ii) the enactment of legislation that makes ‘the sharing of future information on prices …’ a specific presumed by object offence. The evidence does not support the NCA’s conclusion that the public PMI premium increase announcements by five insurers, a broker and a broker representative body were either a by object or a by effect breach of competition law. There are solid grounds for following the European Union’s existing open-ended approach to adding by object breaches through the development of case law, rather than legislating specific new by object offences. The sharing of information can, depending on the circumstances, be anticompetitive or procompetitive. It is thus inappropriate to characterise sharing of information as a by object offence, without an appropriate definition and guidance. This is not to imply that the competition in the PMI market in Ireland cannot be improved, as the European Commission’s acceptance in 2022 of binding commitments from the insurers trade association easing access to a data sharing platform so as to facilitate entry demonstrates. Keywords: private motor insurance, Competition Act 2002, Competition (Amendment) Act 2022, concerted practice, tacit collusion, Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, price signalling.

Bruce Wardhaugh

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 2, Page 122 - 131

This article is concerned with regulation of dynamic pricing algorithms under the EU competition regime. We show that the competition rules as presently interpreted fail to inadequately capture the harm to consumer welfare that dynamic pricing algorithms may cause. This creates an enforcement ‘gap’ in a competition regime which purports to protect consumer welfare. We then argue the existing rules need to be slightly reframed, if such algorithmic practices are to be effectively controlled. This reformulation includes regarding coordinated price elevation as a concerted practice which Articles 101 and 102 TFEU can interdict, viewing price elevation in algorithmic markets as a form of tacit collusion and as a breach of dominant undertakings’ special responsibility not to further weaken competition in a market. Our suggestions are consistent with existing Article 101 and 102 TFEU case law and allow for a more effective response to any welfare reducing threat found in algorithmic markets. Keywords: Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU, algorithms, dynamic pricing, tacit collusion, object/effects, concerted practice