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The search returned 7 results.

Changing Competition Law for the Digital Sector journal article

Kiran Desai

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 1, Page 11 - 23

Policy debate in the EU and international fora and institutions are leading to proposed changes to competition law as applied to the technology and in particular digital sectors. A review of the proposals identifies two groups, first, those that are a more aggressive application of competition law and second, those addressing non-traditional goals, such as data privacy. The EU’s Digital Markets Act is an example of the latter, while a change to the EU Merger Regulation is an example of the former. The proposed changes are open to criticism, for example because they create a differential application of competition law to one sector compared to others and there are definitional challenges. Furthermore, competition economic analysis, with its emphasis on consumer welfare,may need to be broadened to enable a normative and theoretical consistency between the current laws and the proposed changes. In addition, where the changes are to address goals not susceptible to such analysis, such as human rights, lawyers will need to be open to adding arguments based on other jurisprudential theories to support their cases. Keywords: competition; digital; proposals; objective; economics


Tacit Collusion and the Boundaries of Competition Law: journal article

The Parallel Case of Common Ownership and Algorithmic Pricing

John Weche, Thomas Weck

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 1, Page 4 - 10

Tacit collusion gives rise to major practical challenges for the enforcement of competition law. A problem which is well known from the gas station markets, now acquires new topicality with the intervention of institutional investors (‘common ownership’) and the use of online pricing algorithms. This article connects the previous strands of discussion and establishes a link to the discussion regarding a New Competition Tool. Keywords: tacit collusion; algorithms; common ownership; Digital Markets Act; DMA; New Competition Tool; NCT




Estimating Reasonable Prices for Access to Digital Platforms’ Data: journal article

What Are the Challenges?

Jordi Casanova Tormo

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 3, Page 172 - 184

This article reviews the competition case law and the approach of utility regulation to address excessive prices. It considers the potential challenges of applying a reasonable prices framework to access to digital platforms’ data, due to the difficulties in assessing an appropriate return on digital platforms’ investments in R&D. Following this conclusion, the article proposes to assess whether lighter forms of intervention may be sufficient to address the market failures identified and to introduce access to data if these are not likely to succeed. Keywords: reasonable prices; price regulation; digital platforms; access to data; data regulation


The SSNIP Test and Zero-Pricing Strategies: journal article

Considerations for Online Platforms

Daniel Mandrescu

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 4, Page 244 - 257

The increasing critique on the business practices of the major online platforms in Europe is gradually leading to a rising in the number of abuse of dominance investigations and prohibition decisions. Such present and future cases revolving around the dominant position of various online platforms depend greatly on the correct definition of the relevant market. The process of the market definition with regard to online platforms requires, however, revisiting the compatibility of the current competition law tool kit, particularly in the case of the hypothetical monopolist test (HMT). Accordingly, the application of the HMT based on a small but significant non transitory increase in price (SSNIP) test of demand elasticity, will require an overhaul in order to maintain its relevance in the case of zero-pricing strategies commonly used by online platforms. In such cases the only feasible option for assessing demand elasticity for the purpose of performing the HMT entails converting the price centred analysis into a quality oriented one, namely based on a small but significant non transitory decrease in quality (SSNDQ). In the absence of such a conversion the market definition in the case of online platforms relying on zero-pricing will be performed solely based on a qualitative evaluation of the functionalities facilitated by such platforms as seen in the Google Shopping case. Although such outcome is not inherently problematic it does imply backtracking to older practices rather than advancing the development of a more future resilient legal framework and tool kit which should always be pursued. Keywords: Online Platforms, Market Definition, Digital Economy, Market Power, Data Costs, Quality Considerations, Demand Elasticity


The ECN Grand Chamber: journal article

Updating the ECN to Face the Challenges of the Online World

Gabriele Carovano

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 3, Page 166 - 186

It is the overriding belief that EU competition rules should be applied uniformly, but reality shows that this is not the case. Moreover, the so-called ‘Digital Revolution’ has intensified the risk of non-homogeneous results by raising the number of multinational players, cross-border cases, and new competition issues needing a solution. This article argues that enhancing uniformity should not necessarily mean the eradication of diversity. Uniformity should instead be the result of a process able to canalise diversity. Hence, space within the system should be created where diversity can be utilised to produce better quality policies and avoid conflicting results. The article then suggests how this diversity should be co-ordinated within the European Competition Network (ECN) where the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and the Commission share policy solutions and ideas. In particular, the article will suggest how the ECN should be modified to be able to balance the unbalanced, to transform externalities into internalities. NCAs should not only act in defence of their National interests or consumers, but should pursue one single goal: the protection of the European interests and consumers. ‘Un pour tous, tous pour un’. Keywords: European Competition Network, ECN Plus Directive, Consistency, Cooperation, Digital Single Market, National Competition Authority

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