Implementation of the ECN+ Directive ∙ Slovenia: Watchdog Not Entirely Happy with Proposed Draft Bill Amidst Tardy Implementation journal article Tine Mišic European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 315 - 320
Implementation of the ECN+ Directive ∙ Poland: Broader Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations journal article Tomasz Feliszewski, Mateusz Musielak European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 299 - 304
Implementation of the ECN+ Directive ∙ Spain: A First Assessment journal article Jerónimo Maillo European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 321 - 324
Implementation of the ECN+ Directive ∙ Slovak Republic: Will the New APC Improve the Enforcement of Competition Law? journal article Mária T. Patakyová, Mária Patakyová European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 310 - 314
Implementation of the ECN+ Directive ∙ Sweden: Extended Powers for the Competition Authority journal article Helene Andersson European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 325 - 329
Implementation of the ECN+ Directive ∙ Portugal: Small but Significant Non-Guaranteed Improvements journal article Miguel Sousa Ferro, Ana Rita Calmeiro European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 305 - 309
Parallel Enforcement of Global Cartels: journal article Facts and Figures Pieter J.F. Huizing European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 2, Page 96 - 107 The history of active enforcement of cartels having a worldwide scope does not go back much further than twenty-five years. But a remarkable development has taken place within this relatively short timeframe. This article aims to provide quantitative insight into the changing nature of global cartel enforcement. It identifies 41 global cartels which were subject to corporate fines and which were discovered between 1990 and 2018. An analysis of the sanctioning of these cartels shows that more and more authorities are pursuing global cartels, often in parallel. The Auto parts, Maritime car carriers and Air cargo cartels for example were each subject to fines in ten or more different jurisdictions. The proliferation of authorities pursuing global cartels has contributed to the dramatic rise of the overall level of fines imposed for global cartel conduct. There are now nine global cartels for which penalties exceeding $1 billion have been imposed. In view of the increasingly crowded enforcement community, one would expect to see greater levels of inter-agency coordination in respect of not just the investigation but also the punishment of global cartels. However, attempts to coordinate the outcome of proceedings in order to reach an overall proportionate fine still appear to be both ad hoc and rare. Keywords: global cartels; international cartel enforcement; cartel fines; parallel enforcement; inter-agency coordination
Marine Harvest v Commission: Separate Fines for a Double False Start (C-10/18 P Mowi ASA v European Commission) journal article Georgia Tzifa, Marilena Nteve, Lukas Šimas European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 3, Page 223 - 230 Case C-10/18 P Mowi ASA v European Commission, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 4 March 2020 The Court upholds the imposition of separate fines for an infringement of the notification and standstill obligations under EU merger control
PZU Życie: National Competition Law Is Alive and Kicking Thanks to the Threefold Test for Idem (C-617/17 Powszechny Zakład Ubezpieczeń na Życie) journal article Francesco Rizzuto, Monika Ewa Lynch European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 3, Page 236 - 242 Case C-617/17 Powszechny Zakład Ubezpieczeń na Życie S.A. v Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Fourth Chamber) of 3 April 2019 The Court of Justice confirms the continued importance of national competition law as a distinct legal interest to protect. The infringing undertakings can face distinct penalties for the same infringement if an NCA can show that the harm caused to national and EU markets is distinct in its temporal and jurisdictional effects.
Finland ∙ Fines Increased in the Bus Cartel Case journal article Satu-Anneli Kauranen European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 1, Page 27 - 32
Theories of Harm in the Implementation of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation Adina Claici, Peter Davis, Gerhard Dijkstra