Pernille Edh Hasselgård

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 1, Page 44 - 48

Nicholas Levy, Andris Rimsa, Bianca Buzatu

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 4, Page 364 - 379

In March 2021, in an effort to secure jurisdiction over transactions that might otherwise escape review under EU and national merger control rules, the European Commission (EC) published guidance encouraging Member State competition authorities to ask the EC to examine potentially anti-competitive concentrations that fall below national merger control thresholds. To date, in a decision that is under appeal to the General Court, the EC’s new guidance has been applied only once to refer the Illumina/Grail transaction to the EC. More generally, the EC’s new guidance has proven controversial, revealing divergences between certain Member State antitrust agencies and the EC. Keywords: merger notification thresholds, EU Merger Regulation, killer acquisitions, interagency coordination

Heinrich Kühnert, Elisabeth König

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 216 - 220

Georgia Tzifa, Marilena Nteve, Lukas Šimas

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 3, Page 223 - 230

Case C-10/18 P Mowi ASA v European Commission, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 4 March 2020 The Court upholds the imposition of separate fines for an infringement of the notification and standstill obligations under EU merger control

Ronan Dunne

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 3, Page 202 - 204

Ronan Dunne

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 1, Page 33 - 35

Vasiliki Fasoula

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 3, Page 232 - 236

Case T-194/13 United Parcel Services, Inc v European Commission, Judgement of the General Court of 7 March 2017 Article 263 TFUE – Annulment of a Commission’s decision declaring a notified merger incompatible with the internal market and with the EEA agreement – postal services – Statement of Objections – econometric analysis – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - procedural irregularity – right to a fair and public hearing – rights of defence

András Tóth

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 4, Page 258 - 270

This article provides a practical overview of the most recent and interesting developments arising from the national enforcement of EU competition law. It is not only the preliminary rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union that highlight interesting competition cases taking place at national level. For example, as will be discussed in this article, other important developments such as the recognition of compliance programmes and the first pricing algorithm case also occurred at national level. It appears that national competition authorities (NCAs) are more opened to ensure consistency between competition and other policies, such as the protection of personal data (eg the Facebook case in Germany) and the promotion of small and medium sized enterprises. NCAs can more rapidly adapt to the changing competition policy context, as can be seen, for example, in their treatment of mergers involving targets not possessing high enough turnover but having significant market potential. The ECN+ Directive provides NCAs with a minimum common tool-kit and effective enforcement powers for the implementation of EU antitrust rules in many important areas. However, there are still significant areas (eg regarding the admissibility of criminal evidence and multiple filings) where further improvements would be desirable in the future. Keywords: Data Driven Economy, Multiple Merger Filing, Admissability of Criminal Evidences, European Competition Network (ECN), Cross-Border Enforcement of Competition Fines

Nicole Rosenboom

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 4, Page 271 - 279

National competition authorities have assessed many hospital mergers over the years. During merger control proceedings, the authority determines the negative effects of the merger in the form of a potential price increase and decrease in the quality of care provided by the hospital. These assessments are difficult. Merger control can lead to heated debates and questions over whether the analysis is correct and considers all possible outcomes. To provide a full analysis of the effects of a hospital merger for all relevant actors (patients, the hospital itself, health insurers, the government, and hospital staff) the Social Cost and Benefit tool can be used. This framework is applied in other fields of economics, but it can be useful in cases that involve public interest and non-competition concerns. One could call the tool the Competition Cost and Benefit Analyses (CCBA) tool when it is adjusted for use in a merger case. This article demonstrates how the CCBA can be used and how the unique features of a national healthcare and health insurance system can be taken into account during its use. This article applies the framework to the Netherlands due to recent developments in that country and the call for more focus on public interests in merger control of Dutch hospitals. Keywords: Merger Control, Hospitals, Price, Quality

Ronan Dunne

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 4, Page 293 - 295