Skip to content
  • «
  • 1
  • »

The search returned 2 results.

Intel Renvoi: The General Court Sets a Course to Steer the EU Through Troubled Waters journal article

Martin Toskov

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 7 (2023), Issue 2, Page 125 - 128

Case T-286/09 RENV Intel Corporation v Commission, Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) of 26 January 2022 Just over a year ago, the General Court (GC) handed down its second judgment of the Intel saga. The judgment largely follows the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) findings from 2017.1 The case centres around the conditional rebates Intel used in its dealings with trading partners. Specifically, the place of the as-efficient-competitor (AEC) test in non-price-based abuses of dominance under Article 102(c) TFEU2 and the role of effects-based analyses in fidelity rebates. The new, more effects-based approach adopted by the GC is both welcome and necessary. It ensures that EU competition law encourages, rather than dampens, entrepreneurship and is thus a tool fit to guide the EU through the current economic difficulties.


Qualcomm: Numerous Procedural and Substantive Shortcomings Lead to Spectacular Commission Defeat journal article

Anton Gerber

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 7 (2023), Issue 3, Page 183 - 188

Annotation on the Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) of 15 June 2022 in Case T-235/18 Qualcomm v Commission In 2018, the European Commission adopted a decision finding that Qualcomm had abused its dominant position on the relevant worldwide open market for LTE chipsets by offering exclusivity payments to its customer Apple. The EU General Court upheld Qualcomm’s challenge of that decision. The ruling came shortly after another high-profile Commission defeat concerning Article 102 TFEU’s application on presumed foreclosure effects, caused by a loyalty rebate scheme employed by another chipmaker (Intel). The Qualcomm judgment points out a number of procedural and substantive flaws, and its repercussions seem to have already changed the way the Commission conducts antitrust proceedings. It may have fuelled the Commission’s recently launched process to update its approach for the assessment of exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings.

  • «
  • 1
  • »