Björn Lundqvist

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 186 - 199

The article aims to address the problem of so-called killer acquisitions broadly, extending also to strategic alliances and other forms of collaborations. We find that ‘killer situations’ can appear in all forms of collaborations that imply a change of control of research results. We therefore conclude in this part I that for the Competition Authority to only focus on killer acquisitions in the form of mergers can be counterproductive. Both mergers and strategic alliances in the pharmaceutical industry would instead benefit from a more intense competition law scrutiny, and in part II we develop what is needed to intensify the competition law scrutiny of accquisitions and collaborations. Keywords: pharmaceutical, mergers, antitrust, killer acquisitions

Mariya Papazova

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 221 - 225

Björn Lundqvist

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 4, Page 344 - 363

In two consecutive articles, of which this is the second one, I analyse so-called ‘killer acquisitions’ and other collaborations detrimental to competition. In this article, I have analysed the merger rules and whether they can identify and capture the problematic cases identified in Part I. After concluding that this is not the case, I present a proposal that I believe would benefit competition and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. I suggest that certain firms in the pharmaceutical sector should be obliged to notify collaborations that imply change of control over research, research assets or research results, and that the focus under the merger rules should be on innovation and innovation results. A notification system should thus be put into place also for strategic alliances including license agreements and R&D collaborations in which the control over promising research or research capabilities is transferred to a large pharmaceutical firm. Such transfer is conducted through the covenants and restrictions of an R&D start-up and its key employees, even though there are no formal change of control of the start-up as such. I furthermore suggest that that ancillary agreements to such collaborations including shareholding agreements and option programmes that imply that leading researchers are locked-in by explicit or implicit non-compete and other forms of covenants should be scrutinised in the merger review. Keywords: mergers, antitrust, killer acquisitions

Mariya Papazova

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 4, Page 399 - 403

Bogdan Marius Chirițoiu, Vlad Dan Roman

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 4, Page 309 - 313

Jan Blockx

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 3 (2019), Issue 4, Page 354 - 362

The arguments that have been made against using intent evidence in EU antitrust enforcement are not conclusive. On the contrary, because of the difficulties of conducting economic analyses of the effects of commercial conduct, it makes sense to look at the intentions of the persons engaging in that conduct to interpret their behaviour. Also for the punishment of anticompetitive behaviour, the presence or absence of anticompetitive intentions should be relevant. Keywords: Antitrust, Intent, Enforcement

Rodrigo Londoño van Rutten, Caroline Buts

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 3 (2019), Issue 1, Page 4 - 16

A hub and spoke (H&S) cartel entails both horizontal collusive behaviour and the involvement of at least one member operating at a different level of the supply chain. The blend of vertical and horizontal restraints raises both economic and legal questions. This article explores the main determinants for the existence of H&S cartels. Based on twelve cases, we first build a typology and analyse three types of H&S cartels. We focus on the structure of the cartel, the collusive mechanism and the economic incentives of participants. For each type, we thus discuss the elements that are necessary to fix the anticompetitive cooperation. In a second phase, we present descriptive statistics on the number of players, on cartel duration and on the length of procedures. Finally, we present a brief generalised summary for two main H&S cartel types. The purpose is to gain a better understanding of the hub and spoke cartel phenomenon. Keywords: Hub and Spoke Cartels, Antitrust, Cartel Structure, Cartel Stability

Ana Cacho Lacarra

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 3 (2019), Issue 3, Page 252 - 260

Citizens and undertakings can write to the European Commission to inform about suspected infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Complaints are crucial for an effective antitrust enforcement. However, not all complaints give rise to serious anticompetitive concerns and given its limited resources, the Commission is entitled to give different degrees of priority to them. The present article gives an overview on the common grounds for the rejection of complaints in Antitrust and the recent relevant case law. Keywords: Antitrust, Complaint, Rejection, Priorities, Union Interest