Pieter J.F. Huizing

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 2, Page 96 - 107

The history of active enforcement of cartels having a worldwide scope does not go back much further than twenty-five years. But a remarkable development has taken place within this relatively short timeframe. This article aims to provide quantitative insight into the changing nature of global cartel enforcement. It identifies 41 global cartels which were subject to corporate fines and which were discovered between 1990 and 2018. An analysis of the sanctioning of these cartels shows that more and more authorities are pursuing global cartels, often in parallel. The Auto parts, Maritime car carriers and Air cargo cartels for example were each subject to fines in ten or more different jurisdictions. The proliferation of authorities pursuing global cartels has contributed to the dramatic rise of the overall level of fines imposed for global cartel conduct. There are now nine global cartels for which penalties exceeding $1 billion have been imposed. In view of the increasingly crowded enforcement community, one would expect to see greater levels of inter-agency coordination in respect of not just the investigation but also the punishment of global cartels. However, attempts to coordinate the outcome of proceedings in order to reach an overall proportionate fine still appear to be both ad hoc and rare. Keywords: global cartels; international cartel enforcement; cartel fines; parallel enforcement; inter-agency coordination

Thomas Wilson, Arjun Chandran

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 4, Page 324 - 327

Case C-39/18 P Commission v ICAP and Others, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Third Chamber) of 10 July 2019 The Court of Justice’s judgment in the ICAP case confirms that European Courts will not shy away from annulling Commission decisions due to violations of procedural rights and that there is a general trend towards scrutinizing Commission decisions more closely. The Court’s ruling makes it clear that the Commission must provide sufficient reasons concerning the methodology used when setting the fine for a cartel facilitator. At the same time, it can be expected that the Commission will continue to prosecute cartel facilitators rigorously, as the Court did not take issue with the facilitator doctrine as such.

Philipp Zurkinden, Bernhard Lauterburg

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 4, Page 320 - 323

Baskaran Balasingham

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 3 (2019), Issue 4, Page 363 - 370

Effectiveness and due process require careful balancing in order to safeguard a workable enforcement environment. On the one hand, the legal qualification of collusive conduct has been facilitated to some degree by a broad interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU and the use of presumptions. On the other hand, the burden and standard of proof, as well as the judicial review in relation to EU cartel proceedings satisfy the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This article argues that the EU Courts have succeeded in establishing a proper balance between effective cartel enforcement and the protection of fundamental rights. Keywords: Article 101 TFEU, Cartel Enforcement, Effectiveness, Fundamental Rights, Judicial Review

Rodrigo Londoño van Rutten, Caroline Buts

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 3 (2019), Issue 1, Page 4 - 16

A hub and spoke (H&S) cartel entails both horizontal collusive behaviour and the involvement of at least one member operating at a different level of the supply chain. The blend of vertical and horizontal restraints raises both economic and legal questions. This article explores the main determinants for the existence of H&S cartels. Based on twelve cases, we first build a typology and analyse three types of H&S cartels. We focus on the structure of the cartel, the collusive mechanism and the economic incentives of participants. For each type, we thus discuss the elements that are necessary to fix the anticompetitive cooperation. In a second phase, we present descriptive statistics on the number of players, on cartel duration and on the length of procedures. Finally, we present a brief generalised summary for two main H&S cartel types. The purpose is to gain a better understanding of the hub and spoke cartel phenomenon. Keywords: Hub and Spoke Cartels, Antitrust, Cartel Structure, Cartel Stability

Dimitris Vallindas, Ciara Barbu-O’Connor

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 4, Page 303 - 307

Case T-419/14 The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc v European Commission, Judgment by the General Court of the European Union of 12 July 2018 On parental liability of financial investors in a company found liable of participating in a cartel in breach of EU competition rules and the application of the presumption and the demonstration of actual exercise of decisive influence. Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; OJ 2008 L115/47 and Articles 2 and 23 of Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty; OJ 2003 L1.