Implementation of the ECN+ Directive ∙ Lithuania: Investigative and Sanctioning Powers of the Lithuanian Competition Council - Making a Strong NCA journal article Rita Paukštė European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 276 - 279
Implementation of the ECN+ Directive ∙ Portugal: Small but Significant Non-Guaranteed Improvements journal article Miguel Sousa Ferro, Ana Rita Calmeiro European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 305 - 309
Implementation of the ECN+ Directive ∙ Netherlands: Strengthening Cooperation with National Competition Authorities journal article Karlijn de Groes, Tim Raats European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 294 - 298
Implementation of the ECN+ Directive ∙ Latvia: Still a Long Way to Go journal article Liga Merwin European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 273 - 275
Implementation of the ECN+ Directive ∙ Spain: A First Assessment journal article Jerónimo Maillo European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 321 - 324
Implementation of the ECN+ Directive ∙ Sweden: Extended Powers for the Competition Authority journal article Helene Andersson European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 325 - 329
The Dutch Leniency Programme Turns 18: journal article Still Having a Hoot, or Pause for Thought? Nicole Rosenboom European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 3, Page 194 - 201 Eighteen years ago, the Dutch leniency programme was introduced. The success of the leniency programme is closely linked to the developments around damages claims and firms’ awareness of the impact of other forms of damages. This article looks at past developments in cartel enforcement policy, the impact of damages claims, and deterrent effect of the leniency programme on new and existing cartels and its impact on the number of cartel cases in the Netherlands. It seems that private damages claims are growing up fast, and may well outgrow their younger sibling in terms of their deterrent effect. Keywords: leniency; ACM; private damages; deterrence effect; whistle blower
A Quantitative Analysis of the Efficiency of the EU’s Leniency Policy journal article Lynn Vanhaverbeke, Caroline Buts European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 1, Page 12 - 22 Leniency policies constitute an essential part of antitrust enforcement. They are crucial for the detection as well as the deterrence of anticompetitive behaviour. While the usefulness of such policies is beyond doubt, and despite a wide range of theoretical models, very few studies quantitatively investigate their efficiency. By means of regression and variance analyses, this article studies the effects of the EU’s leniency policy from 1985 until 2017. More specifically, we analyse whether the leniency notice i) influences the amount of information that companies reveal to the European Commission, and ii) impacts the duration of the Commission’s investigation. We find that leniency policy leads companies to reveal more information regarding the anticompetitive conduct. Interestingly, leniency also increases the length of investigation procedures. Keywords: leniency policy; efficiency; provision of information; duration of investigation
Belgium ∙ Belgian Supreme Court Confirms Heavy Burden of Proof to Oppose Disclosure of Leniency Documents to Parties Claiming Damages in Follow-On Proceedings journal article Jeroen Dewispelaere, Joren Vuylsteke European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 4, Page 290 - 292
Theories of Harm in the Implementation of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation Adina Claici, Peter Davis, Gerhard Dijkstra