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The search returned 7 results.

The Theory of Economic Unit and the ‘Downward’ Liability of Subsidiaries for the Sins of Their Parent Companies: Better Not! (C-882/19 Sumal) journal article

Catarina Vieira Peres de Fraipont, Inês Neves

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 6 (2022), Issue 1, Page 98 - 103

Case C‑882/19 Sumal, S.L. v Mercedes Benz Trucks España, S.L., Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2021 By judgment of 6 October 2021, in the Sumal case, the Court of Justice ruled that the victim of an anticompetitive infringement may bring an action for damages, either against a parent company who has been addressed by an infringement decision of the European Commission, or against a subsidiary which is not referred to in that decision. In order to do so, those two entities have to be part of the same economic unit and there has to be a specific link between the economic activity of that subsidiary and the subject matter of the infringement for which the parent company was held to be responsible.

Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Regulated Industries: journal article

Can Railway Undertakings Recover Excessive Railway Infrastructure Charges Under Article 102 TFEU?

Heike Schweitzer

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 6 (2022), Issue 1, Page 4 - 16

In DB Station & Service AG, the CJEU will have to decide on the relationship between EU regulatory law – namely Directive 2001/14 – that strives to concentrate decisions on the lawfulness of infrastructure access charges with the regulatory authority, and private damage claims based on a concurrent violation of Article 102 TFEU. The referring court – the KG Berlin – proposes that national civil courts may only award competition law damages once the regulatory authority has established the illegality of the charges under regulatory law. This article argues that the KG Berlin thereby misconceives the hierarchy of norms under EU law and fails to recognise the rights conferred upon individuals by the EU competition rules. Keywords: private enforcement, regulated industries, railways, infrastructure, Article 102 TFEU

The Digital Markets Act: journal article

Improving Its Institutional Design

Giorgio Monti

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 2, Page 90 - 101

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) is a major policy initiative to regulate platform gatekeepers in a more systematic manner than under competition law. This paper reflects on the institutional set-up in the Commission proposal. While the DMA is well-designed, this paper recommends improvement in the following aspects: (i) matching the DMA’s objectives with obligations imposed on gatekeepers; (ii) facilitating a regulatory dialogue; (iii) streamlining the enforcement pyramid; (iv) emphasising the role of private enforcement; (iv) clarifying the role of competition law when the DMA applies. Keywords: Digital Markets Act, DMA, responsive regulation, private enforcement

The Otis Judgement: Another Conformation of the Expansive Scope of Cartel Liability after Kone (C-435/18 Otis) journal article

Martin Gassler

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 1, Page 45 - 48

Case C-435/18 Otis GmbH and others v Land Oberösterreich and others, Judgement of the Court of Justice of 12 December 2019 On 12 December 2019, the Court of Justice (CJ) delivered another preliminary reference ruling that further strengthens private antitrust enforcement in the EU. The CJ followed Advocate General Kokott and ruled that even persons not acting as suppliers or purchasers on the market affected by the cartel can claim damages directly from cartel members. The judgement was delivered upon request by the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberste Gerichtshof) that struggled again – after its request for a preliminary ruling in connection with the same elevator cartel in 2014 that led to the Kone judgement – to apply national tort law that restricted liability of cartel members to only those suppliers and purchasers that are active on the relevant product and geographic market affect by the cartel.

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