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The search returned 4 results.

Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Regulated Industries: journal article

Can Railway Undertakings Recover Excessive Railway Infrastructure Charges Under Article 102 TFEU?

Heike Schweitzer

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 6 (2022), Issue 1, Page 4 - 16

In DB Station & Service AG, the CJEU will have to decide on the relationship between EU regulatory law – namely Directive 2001/14 – that strives to concentrate decisions on the lawfulness of infrastructure access charges with the regulatory authority, and private damage claims based on a concurrent violation of Article 102 TFEU. The referring court – the KG Berlin – proposes that national civil courts may only award competition law damages once the regulatory authority has established the illegality of the charges under regulatory law. This article argues that the KG Berlin thereby misconceives the hierarchy of norms under EU law and fails to recognise the rights conferred upon individuals by the EU competition rules. Keywords: private enforcement, regulated industries, railways, infrastructure, Article 102 TFEU


After 19 Years of Complete Oblivion, Are Interim Measures the European Commission’s New Panacea to Enforce Article 102 TFEU in the Digital Age? journal article

Richard Masquelier

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 1, Page 24 - 35

Over the past few years, fast-moving markets have brought major concerns to competition law in the digital age: speedy solutions are needed to efficiently address situations in which companies become monopolistic after the market has tipped. One existing legal instrument emerged as a solid and plausible solution: the interim measures to prevent harm to competition while an investigation is on-going. The starting point of this paper finds its roots in the Commission’s decision to impose interim measures on Broadcom in 2019, after almost two decades of complete oblivion of this instrument. Two questions arise from this sudden awakening: why was it neglected by the Commission and should it be overhauled? This article delves back into the relevant case law and legislation to critically ascertain the qualities and flaws of interim measures in order to explain their possible revival. Through their respective application of the tool, as well as their variable desire to impose interim measures, national competition authorities have also shed an interesting light on this topic. Finally, it remains to be seen whether the recent Commission proposals for a Digital Market Act (DMA), which aims at preventing abusive conduct by digital gatekeepers with upfront obligations, will leave much space for such interim measures in the future. Keywords: interim measures; remedies; Article 102 TFEU; procedure; European Commission


Let´s Dance! Excessive Royalties and the Economic Value of Music (C-372/19 SABAM) journal article

Behrang Kianzad

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 2, Page 172 - 176

Case C-372/19 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Weareone.World BVBA and Wecandance NV, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Fifth Chamber) of 25 November 2020 The most recent excessive pricing case considered by Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) revolved around fees imposed by a national royalty collective society (SABAM) on two Belgian festival organizers (Weareone.World BVBA and Wecandance NV). The Belgian national court submitted the case to CJEU for a preliminary ruling on whether the imposition of fees was to be considered an abuse of dominant position, and further, whether the fees levied were to be considered unfair and excessive in light of Article 102(a) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.


Closing the Algorithmic Gap: journal article

Rethinking Dynamic Pricing under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU

Bruce Wardhaugh

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 2, Page 122 - 131

This article is concerned with regulation of dynamic pricing algorithms under the EU competition regime. We show that the competition rules as presently interpreted fail to inadequately capture the harm to consumer welfare that dynamic pricing algorithms may cause. This creates an enforcement ‘gap’ in a competition regime which purports to protect consumer welfare. We then argue the existing rules need to be slightly reframed, if such algorithmic practices are to be effectively controlled. This reformulation includes regarding coordinated price elevation as a concerted practice which Articles 101 and 102 TFEU can interdict, viewing price elevation in algorithmic markets as a form of tacit collusion and as a breach of dominant undertakings’ special responsibility not to further weaken competition in a market. Our suggestions are consistent with existing Article 101 and 102 TFEU case law and allow for a more effective response to any welfare reducing threat found in algorithmic markets. Keywords: Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU, algorithms, dynamic pricing, tacit collusion, object/effects, concerted practice

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