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The Limits of Control:

Competition Law Versus Sector Regulation in the Wake of the European Commission Excessive Pricing Decision in Aspen

Behrang Kianzad

DOI https://doi.org/10.21552/core/2022/3/5

Keywords: excessive pricing, Article 102 TFEU, pharmaceutical pricing, competition law, pricing of medicines, sector regulation, law and economics


Despite being heavily regulated, the pharmaceutical sector in Europe has in recent years noted many enforcement decisions against excessive pharmaceutical pricing as an anti-competitive practice under Article 102(a) TFEU. Although described as a ‘rarity’ in competition law in most parts of the doctrine, numerous excessive pricing cases have emerged in Italy, UK, Denmark, and the Netherlands in recent years, but also on the European Commission level. The European competition authority adopted its first excessive pricing commitment decision against a pharmaceutical undertaking (Aspen) in April 2021. Take into account the manifold points of contention in the literature on excessive pricing, concerning the normative issue of preventing supra-competitive pricing on part of dominant undertakings. Add the tension between competition law and sector regulation;, as well as the practical issue of calculating cost, prices and profits for the purpose of finding out the ‘excess’ and ‘unfairness’, and one can see the Aspen case is of particular importance for future cases.
Keywords: excessive pricing; Article 102; pharmaceutical pricing; competition law; pricing of medicines; sector regulation, law and economics

Behrang Kianzad is a research-fellow at Center of Advanced Studies in Biomedical Innovation Law, Faculty of Law, Copenhagen University. This research is supported by a Novo Nordisk Foundation grant for a scientifically independent Collaborative Research Program in Biomedical Innovation Law (grant agreement number NNF17SA0027784).

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