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The search returned 7 results.

The Telenor Case: The (In)compatibility of Zero-rating with the Net Neutrality Principle (C-807/18 and C-39/19 Telenor Magyarország) journal article

Amaryllis Müller, Koo Asakura

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 1, Page 59 - 63

Joined Cases C-807/18 and C-39/19 Telenor Magyarország Zrt. v Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság Elnöke, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 15 September 2020 In this judgment, the European Court of Justice maintains a broad interpretation of the net neutrality principle enshrined in Regulation 2015/2120, in line with the EU’s policy goal of stimulating digital innovation by guaranteeing open internet access. While the judgment provides some necessary clarity on the incompatibility with the net neutrality principle of certain zero-rating products that involve throttling of data traffic, the Court leaves several key questions unanswered as it does not rule on zero-rating practices that are open to all applications of a particular category and do not involve blocking or slowing down of traffic.


Killer Acquisitions and Other Forms of Anticompetitive Collaborations (Part I): journal article

A Case Study on the Pharmaceutical Industry

Björn Lundqvist

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 186 - 199

The article aims to address the problem of so-called killer acquisitions broadly, extending also to strategic alliances and other forms of collaborations. We find that ‘killer situations’ can appear in all forms of collaborations that imply a change of control of research results. We therefore conclude in this part I that for the Competition Authority to only focus on killer acquisitions in the form of mergers can be counterproductive. Both mergers and strategic alliances in the pharmaceutical industry would instead benefit from a more intense competition law scrutiny, and in part II we develop what is needed to intensify the competition law scrutiny of accquisitions and collaborations. Keywords: pharmaceutical, mergers, antitrust, killer acquisitions




Hub and Spoke Cartels: journal article

Incentives, Mechanisms and Stability

Rodrigo Londoño van Rutten, Caroline Buts

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 3 (2019), Issue 1, Page 4 - 16

A hub and spoke (H&S) cartel entails both horizontal collusive behaviour and the involvement of at least one member operating at a different level of the supply chain. The blend of vertical and horizontal restraints raises both economic and legal questions. This article explores the main determinants for the existence of H&S cartels. Based on twelve cases, we first build a typology and analyse three types of H&S cartels. We focus on the structure of the cartel, the collusive mechanism and the economic incentives of participants. For each type, we thus discuss the elements that are necessary to fix the anticompetitive cooperation. In a second phase, we present descriptive statistics on the number of players, on cartel duration and on the length of procedures. Finally, we present a brief generalised summary for two main H&S cartel types. The purpose is to gain a better understanding of the hub and spoke cartel phenomenon. Keywords: Hub and Spoke Cartels, Antitrust, Cartel Structure, Cartel Stability


Revaluing the Role of Intent Evidence in EU Antitrust Law journal article

Jan Blockx

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 3 (2019), Issue 4, Page 354 - 362

The arguments that have been made against using intent evidence in EU antitrust enforcement are not conclusive. On the contrary, because of the difficulties of conducting economic analyses of the effects of commercial conduct, it makes sense to look at the intentions of the persons engaging in that conduct to interpret their behaviour. Also for the punishment of anticompetitive behaviour, the presence or absence of anticompetitive intentions should be relevant. Keywords: Antitrust, Intent, Enforcement


Rejection of Complaints: journal article

Recent Case Law

Ana Cacho Lacarra

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 3 (2019), Issue 3, Page 252 - 260

Citizens and undertakings can write to the European Commission to inform about suspected infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Complaints are crucial for an effective antitrust enforcement. However, not all complaints give rise to serious anticompetitive concerns and given its limited resources, the Commission is entitled to give different degrees of priority to them. The present article gives an overview on the common grounds for the rejection of complaints in Antitrust and the recent relevant case law. Keywords: Antitrust, Complaint, Rejection, Priorities, Union Interest

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