Ruben Korsten

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 6 (2022), Issue 3, Page 195 - 206

Since pioneering work of Choi Gerlach in 2012, not much game theoretical literature has followed to address issues of global cartel formation and international antitrust enforcement. This article addresses this gap, especially with regards to multi-jurisdictional leniency applications. It is found that multi-jurisdictional leniency applications expose international cartel leniency applicants to various risks and have high transaction costs. Therefore, the effectiveness of domestic programmes depends on the possibility of obtaining leniency in other jurisdictions. If an applicant can simultaneously count with leniency in all relevant jurisdictions, the attractiveness of leniency should increase, as the overall benefits for the applicant will be greater. However, if applying for leniency leads to leniency in some jurisdictions but certain penalties in others, this will disincentivise the use of leniency, which would make international cartels more stable. This article thus demonstrates the need for international cooperation in order for leniency policies to be effective. Keywords: antitrust enforcement; cartels; information sharing; international cooperation; leniency

Francesco Rizzuto, Monika Lynch

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 2, Page 162 - 171

Case C-857/19 Slovak Telekom a.s. v Protimonopoly Urad Slovenskej Republiky, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 25 February 2021 In this ruling the Court of Justice of the European has established two key rules that taken together with previous rulings of the Court amount to rendering virtually redundant the principle of ne bis in idem as a defense in the parallel enforcement of competition law in the European Union under Regulation 1/2003. First, it has clarified that the same abusive conduct may constitute a series of separate offences where the abuse concerns distinct products and prosecuting and sanctioning them separately would not be incompatible with the principle of ne bis in idem. Secondly, it ruled that where the Commission relieves a national competition authority of a case, only the Commission decision prevails regardless of the stage or status of proceedings conducted by the national competition authority. The implications for the liability of undertakings may be far-reaching.

Giorgio Monti

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 2, Page 90 - 101

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) is a major policy initiative to regulate platform gatekeepers in a more systematic manner than under competition law. This paper reflects on the institutional set-up in the Commission proposal. While the DMA is well-designed, this paper recommends improvement in the following aspects: (i) matching the DMA’s objectives with obligations imposed on gatekeepers; (ii) facilitating a regulatory dialogue; (iii) streamlining the enforcement pyramid; (iv) emphasising the role of private enforcement; (iv) clarifying the role of competition law when the DMA applies. Keywords: Digital Markets Act, DMA, responsive regulation, private enforcement

Sylvann Aquilina Zahra

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 287 - 293

Michal Petr

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 234 - 238

Satu-Anneli Kauranen

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 248 - 251

Mariya Papazova

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 5 (2021), Issue 3, Page 221 - 225

Leander Stähler, Mariolina Eliantonio

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 4, Page 273 - 288

Soft law issued by the European Commission plays an important role in the area of EU competition law. Focusing on the legal effect of competition soft law as applied by Germany’s national competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt, this contribution analyses how the authority pursues interpretational and decisional objectives through references to competition soft law. This contribution quantifies the references made to soft law and categorises these references on the basis of the involvement of other sources of law in an individual reference. It is shown that the Bundeskartellamt is comfortable making reference to competition soft law as the sole legal basis for certain parts of many decisions, ascribing to competition soft law a strong legal effect in several instances. Keywords: EU soft law; enforcement; Bundeskartellamt; NCAs; EU Commission

Francesco Rizzuto, Monika Ewa Lynch

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 3, Page 236 - 242

Case C-617/17 Powszechny Zakład Ubezpieczeń na Życie S.A. v Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Fourth Chamber) of 3 April 2019 The Court of Justice confirms the continued importance of national competition law as a distinct legal interest to protect. The infringing undertakings can face distinct penalties for the same infringement if an NCA can show that the harm caused to national and EU markets is distinct in its temporal and jurisdictional effects.

Pieter J.F. Huizing

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 2, Page 96 - 107

The history of active enforcement of cartels having a worldwide scope does not go back much further than twenty-five years. But a remarkable development has taken place within this relatively short timeframe. This article aims to provide quantitative insight into the changing nature of global cartel enforcement. It identifies 41 global cartels which were subject to corporate fines and which were discovered between 1990 and 2018. An analysis of the sanctioning of these cartels shows that more and more authorities are pursuing global cartels, often in parallel. The Auto parts, Maritime car carriers and Air cargo cartels for example were each subject to fines in ten or more different jurisdictions. The proliferation of authorities pursuing global cartels has contributed to the dramatic rise of the overall level of fines imposed for global cartel conduct. There are now nine global cartels for which penalties exceeding $1 billion have been imposed. In view of the increasingly crowded enforcement community, one would expect to see greater levels of inter-agency coordination in respect of not just the investigation but also the punishment of global cartels. However, attempts to coordinate the outcome of proceedings in order to reach an overall proportionate fine still appear to be both ad hoc and rare. Keywords: global cartels; international cartel enforcement; cartel fines; parallel enforcement; inter-agency coordination