Maria Gaia Pazzi

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 3, Page 231 - 235

Case C-228/18 Gazdasági Versenyhivatal v Budapest Bank Nyrt. and Others, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Fifth Chamber) of 2 April 2020 How to define a conduct as an anticompetitive restriction ‘by object’ pursuant to Article 101(1) TFEU and when the effects of such a conduct should be considered. Has the Court shifted the burden of proof in the two-prong test under Article 101 paragraph 1 and paragraph 3 of the TFEU and what is the possible impact on the competition authorities’ practice?

Francesco Rizzuto

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 3 (2019), Issue 2, Page 80 - 99

Regulation 1/2003 left it to the Member States to determine the investigative and procedural powers of national competition authorities (NCAs). As a consequence, the enforcement of EU competition law in the Member States has not developed uniformly. Directive 2019/1 puts in place obligations on the Member States to harmonise the status and powers of NCAs in order to create a more uniform competition law single market regulatory space. In short, it aims to establish a level competition law enforcement field relating to investigative and fining powers, resources and independence, leniency, and rules governing mutual assistance between NCAs in the context of the operation of the European Competition Network. Many of the provisions are either closely aligned or indeed replicate the investigative and decision-making powers granted to the Commission under Regulation 1/2003 and the institutional resources and autonomy of national regulatory bodies established under EU sectoral legislation. This Directive in combination with the Private Damages Directive constitutes a significant push towards the federalisation of EU competition law enforcement in line with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Keywords: European Competition Network, ECN Plus Directive, National Competition Authorities

Irene Lorenzo-Rego

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 3 (2019), Issue 2, Page 100 - 109

The abuse of a dominant position based on the collection and processing of personal data is a competition law issue under German law. The value of data is the value of advertising on social networks. Inadequate data processing by Facebook has harmed both users and potential competitors. The Bundeskartellamt has focused its recent decision on efficiency, despite its perspective on the application of Article 19(1) of the Act against Restraints of Competition, in accordance with German case-law. The impact on European competition law will depend on the controversial harmonisation of personality rights; so far, only data protection law has been regulated. Keywords: Access to Personal Data, Injured Party, Abuse of Dominance, Facebook, Bundeskartellamt, Competition Law, Data Protection

Ignacio García-Perrote Martínez

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 3 (2019), Issue 4, Page 371 - 379

Private enforcers of competition law, especially the infringers’ direct and indirect purchasers claiming compensation for the damages suffered, must bring evidence of the existence of an infringement of competition law, the loss suffered, the causal relation between the infringement and the damage, and the specific quantum. The most challenging element to prove is the infringement itself. Given competition authorities’ investigation powers, their decisions become a crucial element to ease the claimants’ burden of proof and to make compensation possible. Keywords: Pre-emptive Administrative Ruling, Competition Authorities Decisions, Damages Actions, Competition Law Enforcement

Miguel Sousa Ferro, Inês Neves

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 3 (2019), Issue 1, Page 48 - 51

Jasper P Sluijs

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 3 (2019), Issue 3, Page 261 - 279

Competitive behaviour by public entities is generally approached in the literature as concerning the traditional State-owned enterprises pursuing public interest objectives. However, increasingly we see examples of commercial divisions of public entities aiming to generate revenue per-se. Because these commercial divisions can enjoy competitive advantages over their private sector competitors, their behaviour may distort competition. This phenomenon has become prevalent throughout the EU, and Member States tend to approach its anticompetitive effects through various competition law(-related) frameworks. This article points out, however, that a competition law framework may be ill-suited to address anticompetitive effects of commercial divisions of public entities. With an ill-functioning and diverging legal framework across the EU, anticompetitive effects of commercial divisions of public entities lead to an uneven playing field between public and private firms with adverse effects on the internal market. Keywords: Competition Law, Mixed Markets, State-owned Enterprises

András Tóth

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 4, Page 258 - 270

This article provides a practical overview of the most recent and interesting developments arising from the national enforcement of EU competition law. It is not only the preliminary rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union that highlight interesting competition cases taking place at national level. For example, as will be discussed in this article, other important developments such as the recognition of compliance programmes and the first pricing algorithm case also occurred at national level. It appears that national competition authorities (NCAs) are more opened to ensure consistency between competition and other policies, such as the protection of personal data (eg the Facebook case in Germany) and the promotion of small and medium sized enterprises. NCAs can more rapidly adapt to the changing competition policy context, as can be seen, for example, in their treatment of mergers involving targets not possessing high enough turnover but having significant market potential. The ECN+ Directive provides NCAs with a minimum common tool-kit and effective enforcement powers for the implementation of EU antitrust rules in many important areas. However, there are still significant areas (eg regarding the admissibility of criminal evidence and multiple filings) where further improvements would be desirable in the future. Keywords: Data Driven Economy, Multiple Merger Filing, Admissability of Criminal Evidences, European Competition Network (ECN), Cross-Border Enforcement of Competition Fines

Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui, Ronny Gjendemsjø

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 4, Page 280 - 289

Ronan Dunne

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 4, Page 293 - 295

Marianne Henne Møller, Simen Klevstrand

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 4, Page 296 - 298