Jordi Casanova Tormo

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 3, Page 172 - 184

This article reviews the competition case law and the approach of utility regulation to address excessive prices. It considers the potential challenges of applying a reasonable prices framework to access to digital platforms’ data, due to the difficulties in assessing an appropriate return on digital platforms’ investments in R&D. Following this conclusion, the article proposes to assess whether lighter forms of intervention may be sufficient to address the market failures identified and to introduce access to data if these are not likely to succeed. Keywords: reasonable prices; price regulation; digital platforms; access to data; data regulation

Kiran Desai

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 4 (2020), Issue 3, Page 210 - 222

Daniel Mandrescu

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 4, Page 244 - 257

The increasing critique on the business practices of the major online platforms in Europe is gradually leading to a rising in the number of abuse of dominance investigations and prohibition decisions. Such present and future cases revolving around the dominant position of various online platforms depend greatly on the correct definition of the relevant market. The process of the market definition with regard to online platforms requires, however, revisiting the compatibility of the current competition law tool kit, particularly in the case of the hypothetical monopolist test (HMT). Accordingly, the application of the HMT based on a small but significant non transitory increase in price (SSNIP) test of demand elasticity, will require an overhaul in order to maintain its relevance in the case of zero-pricing strategies commonly used by online platforms. In such cases the only feasible option for assessing demand elasticity for the purpose of performing the HMT entails converting the price centred analysis into a quality oriented one, namely based on a small but significant non transitory decrease in quality (SSNDQ). In the absence of such a conversion the market definition in the case of online platforms relying on zero-pricing will be performed solely based on a qualitative evaluation of the functionalities facilitated by such platforms as seen in the Google Shopping case. Although such outcome is not inherently problematic it does imply backtracking to older practices rather than advancing the development of a more future resilient legal framework and tool kit which should always be pursued. Keywords: Online Platforms, Market Definition, Digital Economy, Market Power, Data Costs, Quality Considerations, Demand Elasticity

Gabriele Carovano

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 2 (2018), Issue 3, Page 166 - 186

It is the overriding belief that EU competition rules should be applied uniformly, but reality shows that this is not the case. Moreover, the so-called ‘Digital Revolution’ has intensified the risk of non-homogeneous results by raising the number of multinational players, cross-border cases, and new competition issues needing a solution. This article argues that enhancing uniformity should not necessarily mean the eradication of diversity. Uniformity should instead be the result of a process able to canalise diversity. Hence, space within the system should be created where diversity can be utilised to produce better quality policies and avoid conflicting results. The article then suggests how this diversity should be co-ordinated within the European Competition Network (ECN) where the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and the Commission share policy solutions and ideas. In particular, the article will suggest how the ECN should be modified to be able to balance the unbalanced, to transform externalities into internalities. NCAs should not only act in defence of their National interests or consumers, but should pursue one single goal: the protection of the European interests and consumers. ‘Un pour tous, tous pour un’. Keywords: European Competition Network, ECN Plus Directive, Consistency, Cooperation, Digital Single Market, National Competition Authority