Heinrich Kühnert, Mirko Marjanovic

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 7 (2023), Issue 4, Page 227 - 231

Carsten Koenig

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 7 (2023), Issue 2, Page 112 - 117

Martin Milán Csirszki

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 7 (2023), Issue 2, Page 118 - 121

Ana Rita Calmeiro Barroca, Nuno Pires Salpico

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 7 (2023), Issue 2, Page 122 - 124

Joseph Antel, Ciara Barbu-O’Connor, John Carroll, Katie Daw, Robert Klotz

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 6 (2022), Issue 1, Page 35 - 55

Efforts to tackle the increasing market power of data driven platforms are taking a new turn. So far, the European Union has been more aggressive and creative than the United States, notably with severe antitrust enforcement action. However, there is a perceived enforcement gap in platform markets, due to increased concentration, rising profit margins, declining market entry and low investment compared to profits, according to many. With the European Commission proposing the Digital Markets Act and the US ramping up on a number of fronts with an intensified interest in Big Tech and a political climate favourable to an emerging legislative consensus for targeted antitrust law reforms in this field, we are on the verge of new rules to bridge this gap more effectively. This article sheds light on the current developments in the EU and the US, as a basis for the juxtaposition of both approaches and attempt to draw conclusions for future debate. Keywords: digital platforms, antitrust enforcement, upfront regulation, Digital Markets Act, gatekeepers, global convergence and cooperation

Nuno Pires Salpico

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 6 (2022), Issue 3, Page 266 - 270

Ruben Korsten

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 6 (2022), Issue 3, Page 195 - 206

Since pioneering work of Choi Gerlach in 2012, not much game theoretical literature has followed to address issues of global cartel formation and international antitrust enforcement. This article addresses this gap, especially with regards to multi-jurisdictional leniency applications. It is found that multi-jurisdictional leniency applications expose international cartel leniency applicants to various risks and have high transaction costs. Therefore, the effectiveness of domestic programmes depends on the possibility of obtaining leniency in other jurisdictions. If an applicant can simultaneously count with leniency in all relevant jurisdictions, the attractiveness of leniency should increase, as the overall benefits for the applicant will be greater. However, if applying for leniency leads to leniency in some jurisdictions but certain penalties in others, this will disincentivise the use of leniency, which would make international cartels more stable. This article thus demonstrates the need for international cooperation in order for leniency policies to be effective. Keywords: antitrust enforcement; cartels; information sharing; international cooperation; leniency

Heike Schweitzer

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 6 (2022), Issue 1, Page 4 - 16

In DB Station & Service AG, the CJEU will have to decide on the relationship between EU regulatory law – namely Directive 2001/14 – that strives to concentrate decisions on the lawfulness of infrastructure access charges with the regulatory authority, and private damage claims based on a concurrent violation of Article 102 TFEU. The referring court – the KG Berlin – proposes that national civil courts may only award competition law damages once the regulatory authority has established the illegality of the charges under regulatory law. This article argues that the KG Berlin thereby misconceives the hierarchy of norms under EU law and fails to recognise the rights conferred upon individuals by the EU competition rules. Keywords: private enforcement, regulated industries, railways, infrastructure, Article 102 TFEU

Catarina Vieira Peres de Fraipont, Inês Neves

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 6 (2022), Issue 1, Page 98 - 103

Case C‑882/19 Sumal, S.L. v Mercedes Benz Trucks España, S.L., Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2021 By judgment of 6 October 2021, in the Sumal case, the Court of Justice ruled that the victim of an anticompetitive infringement may bring an action for damages, either against a parent company who has been addressed by an infringement decision of the European Commission, or against a subsidiary which is not referred to in that decision. In order to do so, those two entities have to be part of the same economic unit and there has to be a specific link between the economic activity of that subsidiary and the subject matter of the infringement for which the parent company was held to be responsible.

Philipp Zurkinden, Bernhard Lauterburg

European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Volume 6 (2022), Issue 1, Page 82 - 84